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* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. This comment is written in
loving appreciation of the companionship of Chuckles, Dottie, Houdini, Howard, Lucifer,
Nelson, Purrl, Puz, Ratsy, Samantha, Spotty, Sydney, Tessa, Topper and Winston.
1. Simpson v. L.A., 40 Cal. 2d 271 (1953).
2. L.A., Cal., L.A. Municipal Code §53.11.
3. Id.
4. Id.
Carter’s Dissent in Simpson
v. City of Los Angeles:
A Precursor to the Animal
Rights Movement
By Janice Kosel*
In Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, resident taxpayers who owned licensed
dogs who had recently gone astray sought to restrain the enforcement of a city
ordinance.1 Los Angeles Municipal Code section 53.11 (h) allowed the city to
surrender for medical research dogs that had been impounded for a period of
at least five days.2 Subsection (h) of the ordinance did not contain any provi-
sion for notice to the owner of the impounded dog.3 As a result, plaintiffs con-
tended that the ordinance was invalid because it constituted an unlawful taking
of private property.
In a six-to-one decision, the majority of the California Supreme Court dis-
agreed. Subsection (b) of the ordinance required that before the animal could
be sold, notice had to be given to the owner, if known, of every impounded
dog within one day after the dog was impounded.4 “The courts, whenever pos-
sible adopt that interpretation of a statute which will render it constitutional,
and, therefore, the subsections should be read together for the purpose of
avoiding any question of invalidity arising from the lack of a specific notice
requirement in subsection (h). When considered together the subsections re-
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5. See Simpson, 40 Cal. 2d at 280.
6. Id. at 281.
quire that the city must act to give notice to the owner, if known, within one
day after a dog is impounded and that the owner must have at least five days
after receipt of such notice in which to reclaim the animal.”5
If a dog were not wearing a license tag when impounded, the majority held
that no notice to the owner was required. “By prescribing a system of licenses
and requiring dogs to wear a numbered tag at all times when at large on the
streets, the city has done all it can to make sure that it will know the owner’s
identity.. . . If a dog is not wearing a license tag when impounded, its owner will
not have any ground to complain of a failure to receive notice, because the or-
dinance places upon him the duty to make sure that the dog wears its license
tag at all times except when it is indoors or in an enclosed yard or pen.”6
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
I cannot agree with the construction placed by the majority on the sections
of the ordinance in question or that the notice provisions contained in those
sections are sufficient to afford due process of law. Subsection (b) of section
53.11 provides that an owner must be notified within one day after a dog is
impounded and that the animal may be sold thereafter if notice of sale is posted
for two days; under subsection (h) it is provided that no dog may be surren-
dered to a certified institution for experimental purposes unless it has been im-
pounded for at least five days. The majority of this court indulges in some
legerdemain in the field of judicial legislation and comes up with the startling
result that these two sections must be read together: that the one day notice pro-
vision in subsection (b) applies to subsection (h). By reading them together,
the majority rewrites the ordinance so that it provides that an owner has five
days after receipt of actual notice in which to reclaim his dog before it is surrendered
for experimental purposes. This is done, we are informed, “for the purpose of
avoiding any question of invalidity arising from the lack of a specific notice re-
quirement in subsection (h).”Using reasoning such as this, any statute could be
“interpreted” in such a way as to render it constitutional.
The only notice provision applies to dogs about to be sold. There is no no-
tice provision in the subsection providing for surrender of such dogs for ex-
perimental purposes. The sale of a dog and its surrender for experimental
purposes are two entirely different things and there is no basis in logic for the
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statement of the majority that these two subsections must be read together
and that the notice provision of the sale subsection applies to the surrender
subsection. Subsection (b) deals specifically and exclusively with the sale of
impounded dogs; subsection (h) deals only with the surrender of unclaimed,
impounded animals for experimental purposes. . . .
. . . I cannot understand how the one day provision in subsection (b) can
possibly be construed to mean that the owner of the dog must be given actual
notice which must be received, and that he thereafter (subsection (h)) has five
days within which to reclaim his dog. However, by such reasoning, a major-
ity of this court has now placed the constitutional stamp of approval upon the
ordinance. In my opinion the notice provisions are insufficient to afford due
process of law.
In judging what is due process of law, the sufficiency of the notice must be
determined in each case from the particular circumstances of the case in hand,
respect being had to the cause and object of the taking (Wulzen v. Board of Su-
pervisors, 101 Cal. 15; Imperial Water Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Cal. 14).
While it is impossible to define with precision “due process of law,” it means,
broadly speaking, that before a man’s property may be taken by the state, he
must be given notice of the proceedings which may terminate in the taking,
and be given an opportunity to be heard. It means further that the notice shall
be a real and reasonable one. .. . “[U]pon the question of the length of such no-
tice there is a singular dearth of judicial decision. It is manifest that the re-
quirement of notice would be of no value whatever, unless such notice were
reasonable and adequate for the purpose.” [Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 404
(1900) (citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation Dis-
trict, 111 U.S. 701–12)]. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections, Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385; Priest v. Las Vegas,
232 U.S. 604; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398. The notice must be of such nature
as reasonably to convey the required information, Grannis v. Ordean, supra,
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their ap-
pearance. . . . But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture
is not due process.”Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S.306,
314. . . .
If the dog is not wearing a license tag, the majority says that “its owner will
not have any ground to complain of a failure to receive notice, because the or-
dinance places upon him the duty to make sure that the dog wears its license
tag at all times except when it is indoors or in an enclosed yard or pen.” Ap-
13 oppenheimer final 4/20/10 8:42 AM Page 189
190 A PRECURSOR TO THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
parently we now forget about the one-day notice, actual and received, and the
dog is held for the prescribed period of five days before being surrendered to
a hospital or institution for experimental purposes. Under reasoning of the
type indulged in by the majority, we can read the ordinance as circumstances
warrant. So now, no notice being practicable, we just look to the five-day pro-
vision. This period of time is unreasonable. It does not take into consideration
the fact that duly licensed dogs may lose their tags after straying; that they may,
and do, break their collars thereby losing their tags; that strangers may remove
either collar or tag; that dogs may escape from enclosed pens, or get out of the
houses of their owners (where they are not required to wear tags) and wander
far afield. It does not take into consideration the not-unusual cases of theft of
valuable, registered dogs. It does not take into consideration the size of the
city of Los Angeles with its five pounds, and four private shelters, and 19
pounds and animal shelters in Los Angeles County, or the fact that the owner
of the dog might be out of the city when his dog escapes from his home and
the person caring for it, or from a kennel where he has left it to be cared for.
The majority, in placing its approval upon this five-day period, has failed
to consider that when a dog is missing, the owner assumes, often correctly,
that the dog will come home the next day and therefore does nothing for a
one-day period; that the dog may be a “wanderer” who has always returned
from his prior wanderings; and that dogs do not seek the nearest pound or
shelter upon running away. No consideration is given to the obvious fact that
the owner of the dog may advertise for his lost pet, that he may for the first few
days of the dog’s absence call at the pounds and shelters with no success, only
to have the dog picked up later when he has started to advertise for its return.
In my opinion, due process of law requires that the ordinance provide for some
type of notice in cases where the dog is not wearing a license tag. That notice
could be by newspaper advertisement giving the description of the dogs im-
pounded, or by radio announcement, or by posting descriptions in various
places throughout the city.
The ordinance here involved is, in my opinion, unconstitutional in that it con-
stitutes a taking of property without due process of law as the courts have de-
fined that guarantee in both the Constitution of the United States and of California.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
Comment
The central premise of both the majority and dissenting opinions is the idea
that a pet dog is property. Hence, the owner is entitled to due process protec-
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7. See Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
8. Mass. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty for Animals v. Comm’r of Public Health,
158 N.E. 2d 487, 495 (Mass. 1959).
9. Id. at 493.
10. 7 U.S.C. §2158 (1967).
11. Cal. Food & Agric. Code §31,107 (West 2009).
12. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 31,108 (West 2009). Under the Supremacy Clause of
the Federal Constitution, state and local governments are required to follow the federal
standard of holding a dog a minimum of five days.
13. Cal. Const. art. XI, §5.
14. L.A., Cal., L.A. Municipal Code §53.11, supra note 3.
tions under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution prior to
being deprived of that property. A key element of due process is, of course,
notice. Justice Carter relied on a case familiar to all first year law students—
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.7—as the foundation of his ar-
gument that the ordinance’s notice provisions were unconstitutional. Other
jurisdictions at about the same time were unwilling to accept the fundamen-
tal premise that the owner of a stray dog was entitled to due process. For ex-
ample, in Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Commissioner of Public Health, the court emphasized that the rights of ani-
mals are not protected by the Constitution as are the rights of people.8 In up-
holding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the surrender of lost and
stray animals for research after ten days of impoundment without notice to
the owner, the court reasoned that the lost cats and dogs were abandoned prop-
erty. The former owner had no remaining property interest for the Constitu-
tion to protect.9
Perhaps in keeping with the notion that a lost pet is abandoned property,
Congress, in 1967, enacted a statute requiring a pound or animal shelter to
hold a dog or cat for a period of not less than five days to enable it to be re-
covered by its original owner.10 No notice is required by federal statute. How-
ever, notice is typically required by state statute or local ordinance. Today,
California state law provides that no impounded dog shall be killed or other-
wise disposed of without notice to the owner, if known.11 Generally, the required
holding period for a stray dog is three business days before adoption, and six
business days before euthanasia.12
As a charter city, Los Angeles is not bound by that statute.13 Los Angeles
Municipal Code section 53.11 (b) currently provides that stray dogs must be
held for one day during which time the owner shall be notified.14 After one
day, the animal may be sold after notice is posted for two days on the bulletin
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15. Cal. Const. art. XI, §5.
16. See www.laanimalservices.com.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. His grandson Scott Carter reports that, over his lifetime, Justice Carter owned a
succession of pet dogs who often ran free with the horses.
20. Graduate Althea Kippes initiated the course at Golden Gate in 2001. It was the first
animal law course in the Bay Area.
21. 4 Am. Jur.2d Animals §162.
22. See Jay M. Zitter, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of
Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R.5th 545 (2001).
23. Brooks v. U.S., 29 F. Supp. 2d 613 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
boards at the pound, city hall and the central police station.15 Actual practice
is to hold a stray animal for four days.16 An animal with an identification tag
or license is held for ten days.17 The owner is notified by phone or mail.18 Pho-
tos and descriptions of lost and found animals are posted on the website of
the Los Angeles Department of Animal Services.
The basic distinction between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Simpson is phrased as a disagreement over what due process means for the
owner of an impounded dog—what notice is due. At bottom, though, the con-
troversy is more profound. It is rooted in Justice Carter’s keen understanding
of human nature and animal behavior, and his appreciation of the relation-
ship between a person and her pet.19 His analysis was confined by the tradi-
tional notion that animals are property—even the most activist judge is limited
by the tools at hand. That was the only theory by which he could offer pro-
tection to an impounded pet and her owner. But surely Justice Carter’s opin-
ion evinces the conviction that animals are something more than property.
In a very real sense, Justice Carter’s impassioned dissent augured the birth of
the animal rights movement. Today, animal law courses are offered at more
than thirty law schools including Boalt, Duke, Harvard, Yale, and Golden
Gate University.20
The idea that animals are merely the property of their owners is reflected in
the traditional measurement of damages for the wrongful death or injury of a
pet—the market value of a deceased animal or diminution in market value of
an injured animal.21 Modernly, however, a number of courts are willing to
value the emotional relationship between a person and a pet in the calculation
of damages.22 Thus, in Brooks v. U.S.,23 a ranger continued to point a gun at
the family dog after he had shot and wounded it. Despite the fact that the
ranger’s conduct was distressing to nearby family members, the court found
that the ranger’s conduct was reasonable until he could assure himself the dog
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24. Katsaris v. Cook, 180 Cal. App. 3d 256 (1986).
25. See Cal. Penal Code §597 (West 2009).
26. 7 U.S.C. §2131 (1985).
27. Id. §2143.
28. Id. §2149.
29. Id. §2132(g).
30. 16 U.S.C. §1531 (1973).
31. Id. §1538.
did not pose a threat to himself or others. Implicit in the court’s decision is
the idea that, had the ranger’s conduct been unreasonable, he might be liable
for the infliction of emotional distress on the pet’s family.
The California Food and Agricultural Code section 31,103 authorizes a
landowner to kill a dog entering property upon which livestock are con-
fined; the statute specifies that no civil action shall be maintained against the
landowner or employee for the killing of such dog. In Katsaris v. Cook,24 an
employee of a livestock owner shot several dogs that had gotten loose. The
court held that the statute did not protect the livestock owner who made
false assertions after the shooting that she knew nothing about the dogs or
their whereabouts. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a de-
termination of damages for the emotional distress suffered by the dogs’
owner.
In the intervening fifty years since Justice Carter’s dissent, significant legis-
lation has been enacted in recognition of the evolving status of animals in law
and society. State criminal statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals were first en-
acted in the nineteenth century.25 In 1967, nearly one hundred years later, Con-
gress adopted and then in 1985 expanded the Animal Welfare Act to ensure that
animals used in research facilities or exhibited in circuses and zoos are provided
humane care and treatment.26 In particular, the Secretary of Agriculture is di-
rected to promulgate regulations to minimize the pain and distress of animals
in research facilities.27 If those standards are violated, a penalty in the amount
of $2,500 per day may be imposed and the license of the facility may be re-
voked.28 Protected animals include only dogs, cats, monkeys, guinea pigs, ham-
sters, and rabbits; birds, rats, mice, horses, and farm animals are specifically
excluded.29
As part of the emerging environmental movement, in 1973, Congress en-
acted the Endangered Species Act which recognized that human activities were
placing living things at risk of extinction. The legislation seeks to conserve en-
dangered and threatened fish and wildlife.30 In particular, it is illegal to im-
port, sell, or possess endangered or threatened species.31
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32. 42 U.S.C. §§287a–3a.
33. Unif. Trust Code §408 (2000).
34. L.A., Cal., L.A. Municipal Code §53.70; San Francisco Health Code §41.12.
In 2000, Congress enacted the Chimpanzee Protection Act to provide re-
tirement sanctuaries for animals no longer needed for federal research, a costly
but moral alternative to euthanasia.32
The Uniform Trust Code of 2002 specifically authorizes the creation of a
trust for the care of an animal.33
In 2005, the cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco enacted ordinances es-
tablishing specific standards for guardians in the proper care, maintenance,
and tethering of dogs, including requirements for shelter, water and caging.34
Much has been accomplished. But, animal rights advocates believe much work
remains to be done. We may have taken giant strides to protect vanishing
species, our pets and primates who are so closely akin to humans. But what of
other lab animals?
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